

O P 072139Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 024222

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2033

TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [MTCRE](#) [KSCA](#) [TU](#) [PK](#)

SUBJECT: IMMINENT TRANSFER OF FILAMENT WINDING MACHINES
TO PAKISTAN (S)

Classified By: ACTING ISN/MTR DIRECTOR RALPH PALMIERO
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D), AND (H).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Ankara, please see paragraph 4.

¶2. (S) Background and Purpose/Objective: Since 2006, the Turkish company Tet Makina Metal Sanayi Ve Ticaret has been working to supply four- and six-axis filament winding machines to Pakistan. Both of these machines are controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), and we are concerned that these machines could be diverted to missile- or nuclear-related end-users in Pakistan. We want to provide Turkish officials with recent information indicating that Tet Makina is now close to completing this deal and expected these machines to arrive in Turkey on March 15. Tet Makina may be planning to re-transfer this equipment to Pakistan as early as March 12. The transfer of these controlled machines to Pakistan could impact the USG's consultations with Congress on the pending Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation with Turkey (123 Agreement). (NOTE FOR POST ONLY: The activities of Tet Makina are discussed in a classified annex to the 123 Agreement's Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS), which is being provided to Post separately for background purposes only. This case has also been previously discussed with GOT authorities in liaison channels. END NOTE)

¶3. (S) Our information indicates that the entities involved in this transaction may have taken measures to circumvent Turkish export control laws to facilitate this transaction. We therefore want to ask Turkish authorities to investigate immediately this activity with a view towards preventing this equipment from being supplied to Pakistan and to ensure that Tet Makina is not engaged in transferring export-controlled items under false pretenses. We also want to note that this case may be discussed with the U.S. Congress as part of the review process of the 123 Agreement, and decisive action to prevent this transfer could be extremely helpful in informing the Congress of concrete steps taken by Turkey to address proliferation.

¶4. (S) Action Request: Department requests Embassy Ankara approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points in paragraph 5 and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.

¶5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(Secret Rel Turkey)

-- In the spirit of our close cooperation as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Partners, subscribing states to the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), and members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), we would like to alert you to a matter of proliferation concern and request your assistance in investigating this activity.

-- The U.S. has information indicating that since 2006, the

Turkish company Tet Makina Sanayi Ve Ticaret, Ltd. has been working to supply four- and six-axis filament winding machines to Pakistan.

-- We understand that Tet Makina is now close to completing this deal and was expecting these machines to arrive in Turkey on March 5. Tet Makina may be planning to re-transfer this equipment to Pakistan as early as March 12.

-- We are bringing this information to your attention because we understand that the entities involved in this transaction may have taken measures to circumvent Turkish export control laws to facilitate this transaction.

--Because these machines can be coordinated and programmed in three- or more axes, both are controlled by the MTCR, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement, and we are concerned that these machines could be diverted to missile- or nuclear-related end-users in Pakistan.

-- We therefore ask that you immediately investigate this activity with a view towards preventing Turkish entities from acting as a source of supply for a missile or nuclear program in a region of tension and take all appropriate measures to ensure that Tet Makina is not engaged in transferring export controlled items under false pretenses.

-- We also note that this case may be discussed with the U.S. Congress as a part of the review process for the 123 Agreement. The Agreement was submitted to Congress in January for review and consultations between the Executive Branch and Congress on the Agreement are ongoing. Decisive action in this case involving Tet Makina could be extremely helpful if we can inform the Congress of concrete steps taken by Turkey to address proliferation.

--We recognize that there is only a short period of time until this shipment may be transferred from Turkey, but also know that your government shares our concerns that the transfer of this type of equipment to Pakistan poses substantial proliferation risks.

-- We look forward to continued cooperation on nonproliferation issues and to hearing the results of your inquiries into this matter.

END TALKING POINTS.

¶6. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 202-647-3185). Please slug reporting on this or other missile nonproliferation issues for ISN/MTR and EUR/PRA.

¶7. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche in the "MTAG - EUR" folder.
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End Cable Text